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Abstract
We model a DM as a collection of utility functions (selves, rationales)
and an aggregation rule (a theory of how selves are activated by choice sets)
on which we impose ﬁve simple axioms of social choice. This framework en-
compasses many multi-self models proposed in the existing literature. For a
broad class of aggregators we show that with suﬃciently many selves the re-
sulting model can rationalize any choice function. We deﬁne an accounting
procedure for IIA violations and show that for any ﬁxed number of selves,
a lower bound on the set of choice functions that these aggregators can ra-
tionalize is given by the set of choice functions that exhibit no more IIA
violations than a certain linear function of the number of selves.
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It is well known that individuals are generally not very logical, and
that their decision behavior can be modiﬁed by the surrounding culture
or by the acquisition of some special skill. In spite of this, it has to
be admitted that, given a speciﬁc decision, a speciﬁc mind will use a
speciﬁc method”
- Kenneth J. Arrow and Herv´ e Reynaud (1986)
1 Introduction
The classical model of choice endows the decision-maker (DM) with a single pref-
erence relation that she uses to select the best element from any set of alternatives.
The single implication of this model is context-independent behavior, or the Inde-
pendence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), which dictates that if an alternative is
deemed optimal in a set, it must remain optimal in any subset.1 Consequently, a
growing body of evidence suggesting that behavior is prone to context-dependence
has spurred interest in alternative models of decision-making that can facilitate vi-
olations of IIA. In particular, since the seminal work of May (1954), many papers
have proposed models of multi-self decision making to accommodate such behav-
iors.2 This literature includes Kalai, Rubinstein and Spiegler (2002), Fudenberg
and Levine (2006), Manzini and Mariotti (2007), and Green and Hojman (2007)
in economics; Tversky (1969), Shaﬁr, Simonson and Tversky (1993) and Tversky
and Simonson (1993) in psychology; and Kivetz, Netzer and Srinivasan (2004) in
marketing.3 Often these models are motivated by the desire to explain a particular
empirically observed choice behavior not consistent with rational choice. Some ﬁx
the number of selves (e.g., the dual-self model of Fudenberg and Levine (2006))
while others leave the number unrestricted (e.g., Kalai et al. (2002)).
1This also implies transitive choice behavior, which is often violated in experimental settings
(e.g., see Tversky (1969) and Lee, Amir and Ariely (2007)).
2Another approach, developed in Bernheim and Rangel (2007) and Salant and Rubinstein
(2008), allows for context-dependence by considering extended choice situations where behavior
can depend on unspeciﬁed ancillary conditions or frames. While information eﬀects can explain
some context dependence (Sen (1993), Kochov (2007), Kamenica (forthcoming)), they cannot
explain many systematic violations of IIA (Tversky and Simonson (1993)).
3An expanded shortlist of the multiple-selves or multiple-utility literature includes Benabou
and Pycia (2002), Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), Evren and Ok (2007), and Chatterjee and Krishna
(forthcoming). This literature is also related to the application of social choice tools in multi-
criteria decision problems, as in Arrow and Raynaud (1986), and is related more generally to the
theory of multiattribute utility (see Keeney and Raiﬀa (1993)).
2There has been little eﬀort to connect the various models, or to conduct an
analysis of multi-self decision-making using a more systematic approach. In this
paper, we develop a framework to examine a DM with multiple selves, when choice
sets themselves serve as frames that inﬂuence how the preferences of diﬀerent selves
get aggregated. More formally, we propose to model the DM as a collection of
utility functions U (selves or rationales) and an aggregation rule f (decision-making
method) that combines these utility functions in a possibly context-dependent way.
That is, given a choice set A, and selves U, aggregator f speciﬁes an aggregated
utility for every alternative in A. An aggregator corresponds to a theory of how
selves are activated by choice sets. We posit only that the aggregator satisﬁes ﬁve
simple axioms from social choice theory. The multi-self models proposed in the
literature can be translated into this framework, and many of them satisfy the
axioms we impose on the aggregation rule.
Our main point of interest is investigating the set of behaviors that a speciﬁc
model of multi-self decision-making, as captured by a given aggregation rule f,
can rationalize (explain). We address this question both with a ﬁxed number of
selves, as well as with no a priori restriction. Formally, we assume that the DM’s
behavior is described by a choice function c, which speciﬁes the alternative she
selects in each subset of some grand set of alternatives X. We say that a DM’s
choice function is rationalized by a ﬁnite collection of selves U and an aggregator
f if the choice function selects the unique maximizer of aggregate utility f ◦ U
in every choice set. For some aggregators, it is straightforward to determine the
set of choice functions that can be rationalized. For example, if the DM’s method
of aggregating the utilities of her various selves is simple utilitarianism, then the
set of choice functions is exactly the set of rational choice functions, regardless of
the number of selves. But what if the aggregator is the “normalized contextual
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?
Our main result establishes that for a large class of aggregators, including
various aggregators proposed in previous papers (and the example above), if there
is no restriction on the number of selves, the model can rationalize any choice
function. Hence, without knowledge of the number of motivations, the model has
no testable restrictions on behavior. For the same set of aggregators, we provide
3a lower bound on the set of choice functions that can be rationalized given a ﬁxed
number of selves. In particular, we show that the model can rationalize any choice
function that exhibits no more IIA violations than a certain linear function of
the number of selves, where the number of IIA violations is deﬁned by a simple
accounting procedure.
The question of what range of behaviors a given aggregator can rationalize
with a given number of selves can be asked in an alternative way, as what is the
minimum number of selves required to rationalize a given choice function, with
a given aggregator. Hence, our results also address the required complexity of a
rationalization and connect it to the extent to which the choice behavior in question
deviates from rationality, as measured by the number of IIA violations.4
Our main interpretation of the framework is one of individual decision-making
with multiple motives. Psychologists have long viewed the multiplicity of self as a
normal feature instead of a sign of pathology; and even psychologists who prefer a
unitary view of the self accept that “the singular self is a hypothetical construct,
an umbrella under which experiences are organized along various dimensions or
motivational systems” and which “is ﬂuid in that it shifts in diﬀerent contexts
as various motivations are activated” (Lachmann (1996)). This interpretation,
namely that the decision-maker has multiple goals and resolves trade-oﬀs among
these in a manner aﬀected by the choice set, ﬁts our model as well as the more
literal interpretation of multiple selves.
In line with the notion of aggregation in our model, psychologists believe that
a ﬂuid form of compromise among selves is necessary for healthy behavior.5 The
possibility of compromise is an important sense in which our model diﬀers from
Kalai et al. (2002) (henceforth KRS), who were the ﬁrst to address whether a given
choice behavior can be rationalized and to examine the complexity of the required
rationalization. KRS propose that a collection of strict preference relations ratio-
nalizes a choice function if the choice from each set is optimal for at least one of
the preference relations; they show that if there are n alternatives, then any choice
behavior can be rationalized with n−1 rationales. In this view, each self serves as
4Complexity according to this approach is measured by the number of selves, which is anal-
ogous to measuring the complexity of ﬁnite automata by the number of states (e.g., see Salant
(2007) in the decision-theoretic literature).
5This is as opposed to disassociated selves (i.e., overly autonomous selves), or a high self-
concept diﬀerentiation (a lack of interrelatedness of selves across contexts) both of which are
connected to pathological or unhealthy behavior; see Power (2007), Donahue, Robins, Roberts
and John (1993), and Mitchell (1993).
4a dictator for some subset of choices. In contrast, in our framework it can happen
that the choice is not the most preferred alternative of any of the selves, but the
best compromise, in the sense that it maximizes aggregate utility.
There are several recent contributions to the literature on multi-self decision-
making which mostly focus on a diﬀerent set of questions than we do. Of these,
the most related is Green and Hojman (2007) (henceforth GH), who also explain
choice behavior using certain structured aggregation methods. They consider scor-
ing rules, a parametric family of ordinal voting rules able to rationalize any social
choice behavior if one allows for any probability measure on strict preference or-
derings - a result shown in both Saari (1999) and GH. Scoring rules are ordinal
and do not fall within our class of aggregation methods; furthermore, GH do not
address the question of rationalizing choice functions using a restricted domain
of selves, instead focusing attention on welfare analysis using sets of possible ra-
tionalizations.6 Other related work includes Manzini and Mariotti (2007) and
Cherepanov, Feddersen and Sandroni (2008), who consider sequential application
of multiple rationales to eliminate alternatives, a process they show can rationalize
certain choice functions. Finally, Fudenberg and Levine (2006) consider a dual-
self model of dynamic choice, where the two selves’ utilities are aggregated in a
menu-dependent way.7
Besides the primary interpretation using multi-self individual decision-making,
our results can also be used to analyze collective household choice. For this reason,
we extend the analysis to incomplete choice functions, such as demand functions.
Our results complement those of Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Chiappori
and Ekeland (2006) in this context. We can also address questions regarding the
size of the subjective state-space in models of choice over menus, complementing
the results of Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the framework and exam-
ples thereof. Section 2.4 shows how some rule-of-thumb decision-procedures can be
rationalized within this framework. Section 3 describes our accounting procedure
for IIA violations and Section 4 presents our main results. Section 5 considers
two applications of our model. Finally, Section 6 investigates diﬀerent ways of
tightening the bounds on rationalization.
6Bernheim and Rangel (2007) also focus on welfare analysis given choices contradicting ratio-
nal decision-making.
7See also Chatterjee and Krishna (forthcoming) for a model of dual-self decision-making.
52 A framework for rationalizing choice
2.1 Main concepts and deﬁnitions
Suppose that we observe a DM’s choice behavior on a ﬁnite set of alternatives X.
Denote by P(X) the set of nonempty subsets of X. The DM’s choice function
c : P(X) → X identiﬁes the alternative c(A) ∈ A that she chooses from each A ∈
P(X). A rationalization of the DM’s choice function consists of two components,
a collection of selves U and an aggregator f that combines these. The DM’s selves
represent her conﬂicting motivations or priorities. The aggregator corresponds to
the DM’s method of “sorting out” her priorities to come to a decision.
Formally, given a basic set of alternatives X, a self (a.k.a. reason, rationale) is
a utility function u : X → R. Hence, each self is an element of the function space
RX, and u(x) is the utility level that self u allocates to x ∈ X. For each positive
integer n, we denote by Un(X) = ×n
i=1RX the set of all n-tuples of selves deﬁned
over X, and by U(X) = ∪∞
n=1Un(X) the set of all ﬁnite tuples of selves over X.
We will denote a particular collection of selves by U. To denote the number of
selves in U, we use the notation |U| or simply n when no confusion would arise.
An aggregator f speciﬁes an aggregate utility for every alternative a in every
choice set A, given any (ﬁnite) basic set of alternatives X and any collection of
selves U deﬁned over these alternatives. Formally, the domain over which f is
deﬁned is {a,A,X,U|X ∈ X,U ∈ U(X),A ∈ P(X),a ∈ A}, where X is the set of
all conceivable basic sets of alternatives, and every X ∈ X is ﬁnite. We indicate
X explicitly among the arguments of f because we are interested in investigating
how the number of selves needed to rationalize a given choice rule depends on
the number of alternatives in X. Note that since the choice set is one of the
arguments of the function, f aggregates the utilities of the selves in a possibly
context-dependent way.8
Deﬁnition 2.1. We say that a choice function c(·) on X is rationalized by the
aggregator f if there exists a ﬁnite collection of selves U ∈ U(X) such that for
every A ∈ P(X), c(A) = argmaxa∈A f(a,A,X,U).
Although aggregation in the above framework is cardinal (intensities of pref-
erences might matter), the model has the ordinal feature that there can be many
8We could also permit aggregators with restricted domains: let ˆ RX be a convex subset of RX
and deﬁne instead Un = ×n
i=1ˆ RX.
6“equivalent” representations of an aggregator in this context. In particular, if f
rationalizes the choice function c using the selves U, then so does any increas-
ing transformation of f; and similarly, if f rationalizes c using the selves U, then
f ◦ h−1 rationalizes c using the selves h ◦ U, where h : R → R is invertible on the
appropriate domain.
2.2 Basic axioms of aggregation
We are interested in examining theories of aggregation that are in line with the
underlying selves’ preferences. For this reason, for the rest of the paper we restrict
attention to aggregators satisfying the following properties, most of which are
familiar from the theory of social choice. As we will argue below, imposing these
properties is a natural requirement if the aggregation of utilities is cardinal and the
framing eﬀect of a choice set operates only through the utility levels of alternatives
for diﬀerent selves.
To state these properties, we let π : X → X be any permutation and deﬁne
u ∈ RX to be δ-indiﬀerent if |u(a) − u(b)| < δ for all a,b ∈ X. We deﬁne U =
(u1,u2,...,un) ∈ U(X) to be δ-indiﬀerent if ui is δ-indiﬀerent for every i. Also,




P1 (Neutrality) For any permutation π, f(π(a),π(A),X,U ◦π−1) = f(a,A,X,U).
P2 (Single-self respect) For any u ∈ RX, u(a) ≥ u(b) if and only if f(a,A,X,u) ≥
f(b,A,X,u).
P3 (Separability) If f(a,A,X,U) ≥ f(b,A,X,U) and f(a,A,X, ˆ U) ≥ f(b,A,X, ˆ U)
then f(a,A,X,(U, ˆ U)) ≥ f(b,A,X,(U, ˆ U)), with strict inequality if one of the
above holds strictly.
P4 (Continuity at indiﬀerent selves) If f(a,A,X,U) > f(b,A,X,U) then for any
k ∈ Z+ there is δk > 0 such that f(a,A,X,(U,U0)) > f(b,A,X,(U,U0)) for any
δk-indiﬀerent U0 ∈ Uk(X).
P5 (Duplication) If U(a) = U(ˆ a) then f(·,A ∪ {a},X,U) = f(·,A ∪ {ˆ a},X,U).
Neutrality implies that the particular names of elements do not aﬀect their
ranking. Single-self respect is a minimal consistency requirement. Separability
requires that if two collections of selves each prefer the alternative a to the alter-
native b, then these selves combined also prefer a to b. We note that Single-self
7respect and Separability together imply Pareto-optimality. Continuity at indif-
ferent selves requires strict preference orderings implied by the aggregator to be
robust to the addition of nearly-indiﬀerent collections of selves. This is the axiom
that separates the class of aggregators we study from ordinal ones, since repeated
application of the axiom implies that one self’s strict preference ordering is not
reversed by arbitrarily many ﬁnite number of other selves, provided that the latter
selves are all close enough to be indiﬀerent (which only makes sense in a cardinal
setting). Finally, Duplication says that aggregation is only aﬀected by the utility
levels of the alternatives in a given choice set. In particular, choice is not aﬀected
by which of two alternatives is adjoined to a set as long as those two alternatives
yield exactly the same utility to all of the selves.
2.3 Examples of aggregators
The following are examples of context-dependent aggregators satisfying P1-P5,
that are equivalent or closely related to models proposed in the existing literature.
Example 2.2 (Passion-driven and passion-muted models). Suppose there is a
strictly monotonic and continuous weighting function g : R → R such that for all













If g(·) is increasing, the model is a passion-driven one in which selves who are
more “passionate” about the alternatives in the set A receive greater weight in
the decision-process because they are more vociferous than selves who are more
or less indiﬀerent among the possibilities. If g(·) is decreasing,9 the model may
be seen as a passion-muted model or a context-dependent version of the models
of relative utilitarianism in Dhillon and Mertens (1999) and Segal (2000), where
a DM’s weight in society is normalized by her utility range over the grand set of
alternatives. Observe that a is preferred to b in the pair {a,b} if and only if
n X
i=1
g(|ui(a) − ui(b)|)(ui(a) − ui(b))
| {z }
odd function of ui(a)−ui(b)
> 0
9If g(·) is decreasing, we impose the restriction limx→0+ xg(x) = 0.
8Therefore, for pairwise choices the aggregator is similar to the additive diﬀerence
model of Tversky (1969), which accounts for potentially intransitive pairwise choice
behavior by positing utilities v1,v2,...,vn and an odd function φ : R → R such
that x  y if and only if
Pn
i=1 φ(vi(xi) − vi(yi)) > 0. For larger choice sets, the
aggregator can be thought of as a generalization of the additive diﬀerence model
that permits context-dependence.




(ui(a) − midpti(A)) · 1ui(a)≥midpti(A) + λi(ui(a) − midpti(A)) · 1ui(a)<midpti(A)
i
,
where midpti(A) is the midpoint of the range of ui on A and λi is the loss aver-
sion parameter for self i. This aggregator is a speciﬁc formulation of the model
proposed in Tversky and Kahneman (1991), when the reference point for a self is
the midpoint of the utility range given the choice set.
Example 2.4 (Costly self-control aggregators). Fudenberg and Levine (2006) pro-
pose a dual-self impulse control model with a long-run self exerting costly self-
control over a short-run self. The reduced-form model they derive has an analogous
representation in our framework, with two selves: the long-run self, with utility
given by uRF (the expected present value of the utility stream induced by the
choice in the present), and the short-run self, with utility function u (the present
period consumption utility).10 Using our terminology, the reduced form represen-
tation of their model assigns to alternative a the aggregate utility uRF(a) − C(a),
where term C(a) depends on the attainable utility levels for the short-run self and
is labeled as the cost of self-control. For example, using Fudenberg and Levine
(2006)’s parametrization, C(a) = γ[max
a0∈A
u(a0) − u(a)]ψ.
One way to generalize this aggregator to any number of selves would be to
introduce multiple types of short-term temptations, represented by selves u2,...,un,
and to deﬁne the aggregator







ψ, where u1 = uRF.
10The long-run self’s utility is equal to the short-run self’s utility plus the expected continuation
value induced by the choice. If the latter can take any value, then uRF is not restricted by the
short-run utility u. If continuation values cannot be arbitrary (for example they have to be
nonnegative) then u restricts the possible values of uRF, hence U has a restricted domain. In
Fudenberg and Levine (2006) the utility functions also depend on a state variable y. Here we
suppress this variable, instead make the choice set explicit.
9This is an example of an aggregator in our framework in which diﬀerent selves are
treated asymmetrically (here the long-run self is treated diﬀerently than the rest).
Example 2.5 (Contextual concavity models from marketing). Kivetz et al. (2004)
(henceforth KNS) considers various models capturing the compromise eﬀect docu-
mented in experimental settings. KNS consider goods (e.g., laptops) which have de-
ﬁned attribute levels (e.g., processor speed) and posit utility levels (“partworths”)
for a given attribute. That is, they consider multiattribute alternatives and prede-
ﬁne the number of “selves” according to their selected good attributes. One type
of model considered in KNS is referred to as a contextual concavity model. Using









where ci is the concavity parameter and each i corresponds to the i-th attribute.
They also propose a version that is normalized by the range of utilities, which we
featured in Section 1.
In the examples above, the aggregator depends only on utility levels that are
attainable in the choice set. One might also be interested in aggregators that give
greatest weight to selves unhappy with the choice set (e.g., their average utility
over the set is lower than their average utility from other menus). Our framework
permits such dependence on unattainable utility levels, as demonstrated by the
aggregator used in the following section to rationalize a natural decision-rule.
2.4 An example for rationalizing a decision rule
The median procedure is a simple choice rule deﬁned in KRS. There is a strict
ordering  deﬁned over elements of X, and the DM always chooses the median
element of each A ⊆ X according to  (choosing the right-hand side element
among the medians from choice sets with even number of alternatives).













ui(a0) is the median element of the set {ui(a0)}a0∈A, with the convention
10that in sets with an even number of distinct utility levels, for odd i it is the higher
one among the two median utility levels and for even i it is the lower one. The
geometric aggregation implies that in case of selves having exactly the opposite
preferences, the aggregated utility of an alternative from a given choice set is
maximized when it is closest to the median element of the utility levels from the
choice set.
Indeed, we claim that with the above aggregator, two selves can be used to ra-
tionalize the median procedure. Let a1,a2,...,aN stand for the increasing ordering
of alternatives in X according to , and deﬁne u1(ai) = i and u2(ai) = N + 1 − i
for all i ∈ {1,...,N}. It is easy to see that it is indeed the median element of any









u2(a0) is constant across all elements of X, and the two
terms are equal at the median. Therefore the product that deﬁnes f is maximized
at the median.
This rationalization is relatively simple and intuitive: the DM is torn between
two motivations, one in line with ordering , and one going in exactly the opposite
direction. Moreover, the geometric aggregation of these preferences drives the DM
to choose the most central element of any choice set. In contrast, KRS show that in
their framework, in which exactly one self is responsible for any decision, as the size
of X increases, the number of selves required to rationalize the median procedure
goes to inﬁnity.11 While dictator-type aggregators as in KRS do not provide an
intuitively appealing explanation for the median procedure, an aggregator that
captures compromise along selves along the lines of the above-deﬁned f does yield
a model that rationalizes the median procedure in a simple and intuitive way.
There are many variants of the above aggregator that do not select exactly the
median from every choice set, but have a tendency to induce the choice of a cen-





ui(a0)). This aggregator allocates 0 aggregate utility to any element
that is minimal for some self given the choice set, and strictly positive utility to all
other elements (the largest one to the element maximizing the product of utility
surpluses for diﬀerent selves). In general, if f is menu-dependent and aggregates
11Another simple procedure considered in KRS which in their framework requires a large
number of selves to rationalize is the second-best procedure, suggested ﬁrst by Sen (1993). It is
again possible to provide an aggregator ﬁtting our framework such that two selves with opposite
interests rationalize the choice rule - please contact the authors for details.
11the utilities of selves through a concave function, the choice induced by f exhibits
a compromise eﬀect or extremeness aversion, as in the experiments of Simonson
(1989): given two opposing motivations, an alternative is more likely to be selected
the more centrally it is located. If, on the other hand, f is menu-dependent and
convex, then it can give rise to a polarization eﬀect, as in the experiments of Simon-
son and Tversky (1992): the induced choice is likely to be in one of the extremes
of the choice set. Hence, our model can be used to reinterpret experimental choice
data in diﬀerent contexts, in terms of properties of the aggregator function.
3 Counting IIA violations
The examples of decision-rules presented in the previous section violate the Inde-
pendence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) because they are context-dependent.12
IIA requires that if a ∈ A ⊂ B and c(B) = a then c(A) = a. This says that if an
alternative is chosen from a set, then it should be chosen from any subset in which
it is contained. It is well known that a choice function can be rationalized as the
maximization of a single preference relation if and only if it has no violations of
IIA. In the next section we connect the choice functions that a given aggregator
can rationalize with a ﬁxed number of selves to the number of IIA violations that
a choice function exhibits. For this reason, below we formally deﬁne an accounting
procedure for the number of IIA violations.
The number of IIA violations can be determined straightforwardly for choice
functions over three-element sets; e.g., if the choice over pairs is transitive but the
second-best element according to the pairs is selected from the triple, there is one
violation of IIA. For a larger set of alternatives, there are diﬀerent plausible ways





In light of c({a,b,c,d,e,f}) = d, IIA dictates that the last three choices should be
12Under the restriction of single-valued choice, the IIA condition is equivalent to Sen’s α - see
Sen (1971) - or WARP, the weak axiom of revealed preference.
12d (but they are not). In light of c({a,b,c,d,e}) = b, IIA dictates that the choice
from {b,c,d} should be b (but it is not), and the IIA implication for {b,c,d} is
again violated in light of c({a,b,c,d}) = b. Hence, one way of counting would
indicate ﬁve IIA violations with respect to the above four choice sets.
According to the above counting method, a given choice can cause many IIA
violations. Instead, according to our counting procedure, any choice can increase
the number of violations by at most one, and in the above example only the choices
from {a,b,c,d,e} and {b,c,d} are associated with violations. The reason is that
while c({a,b,c,d}) = b does contradict c({a,b,c,d,e,f}) = d, the intermediate
choice c({a,b,c,d,e}) = b itself implies by IIA that c({a,b,c,d}) = b. In sum,
our accounting procedure considers only the ﬁrst violation of a choice, not further
violations of the same choice in subsets of the set associated with the ﬁrst violation.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (IIA violation). The set A causes an IIA violation under the choice
function c(·) if (1) there exists B such that A ⊂ B and c(B) ∈ A\{c(A)}, and (2)
for every A0 such that A ⊂ A0 ⊂ B, c(A0) 6∈ A.
Then, the total number of IIA violations is deﬁned in the natural way.
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Number of IIA violations). The total number of IIA violations of a
choice function c(·) is given by IIA(c) = #{A ∈ P(X) | A causes an IIA violation}.
We remark that one possible alternative measure of the number of IIA violations
is the minimal number of sets at which the choice function would have to be
changed to make it rational. This measure can in general be either larger or
smaller than our measure of the number of IIA violations.13
4 Main results
We now present our main results, which give lower bounds on the choice functions
that an aggregator can rationalize with a given number of selves. For ease of
13Indeed, suppose that pairwise choices exhibit the transitive ranking a preferred to b preferred
to c. Under our measure, there is one violation of IIA if c({a,b,c}) = b, which is defeated once
in the pair {b,c}, and two violations of IIA if c({a,b,c}) = c, which is defeated twice. The
alternative measure counts one violation either way. To see that the alternative measure can also
be larger, consider the choice function over {a,b,c,d,e} which chooses the alphabetically-lowest
alternative in all sets, except that b is chosen in three-element sets in which it is contained as
well as from the pair {a,b}. The alternative measure counts four violations, while ours counts
three. We thank both John Geanakoplos and Bart Lipman for suggesting this measure to us.
13exposition, in this section we restrict attention to aggregators that only depend on
alternatives in the choice set.
P6 (Independence of unavailable alternatives) For any basic sets of alternatives
X,X0 ∈ X such that A ∈ X ∩X0, and for any selves UX ∈ U(X) and UX0 ∈ U(X0)
that agree on A (i.e., UX0(a) = UX(a) for all a ∈ A), the aggregator satisﬁes
f(·,A,X,UX) = f(·,A,X0,UX0).
In Appendix B we extend our results to aggregators violating P6.
We start in Section 4.1 by demonstrating how to construct selves that rational-
ize a choice function in the case of the passion-driven aggregator. The construction
provides intuition for the connection between the number of selves and the number
of IIA violations. In Section 4.2 we generalize the construction to any aggregator
satisfying a property that we call triple-solvability. This property holds for the ag-
gregators in all of the examples we considered. In Section 4.3, we provide suﬃcient
conditions for triple-solvability within the class of anonymous, additively separa-
ble and scale invariant aggregators. In particular, we show that triple solvability
is broadly satisﬁed. For example, it is satisﬁed if the aggregator can rationalize
“third-place choice,” using the terminology of GH; or more generally if the aggre-
gator “stretches” utility diﬀerences in a nonlinear way that we formalize below.
4.1 Rationalizing choice with passion-driven aggregation
Suppose that we are interested in rationalizing some choice function c(·) using the













where g(·) is increasing. Before considering an arbitrary grand set of alternatives
X, let us ﬁrst examine how this aggregator behaves on an arbitrary three-element
set of alternatives ˆ X = {a,b,c}. Supposing that we were to use f to aggregate
the ﬁve selves U = (u1,u2,u3,u4,u5) speciﬁed below, how would f evaluate each
14alternative in each subset of ˆ X?14














It is easy to see that the aggregator selects a from the choice set {a,b}. Observe
that f(a,{a,b}, ˆ X,U) = 4g(2)+g(1) and f(b,{a,b}, ˆ X,U) = 2g(2)+3g(1), hence
f(a,{a,b}, ˆ X,U) > f(b,{a,b}, ˆ X,U) if and only if g(2) > g(1), which holds since
g(·) is strictly increasing. By contrast, the aggregator assigns equal utility to all
alternatives in any other menu:
f(a,{a,c}, ˆ X,U) = f(c,{a,c}, ˆ X,U) = 2g(0) + g(1) + 2g(2)
f(b,{b,c}, ˆ X,U) = f(c,{b,c}, ˆ X,U) = 3g(1) + 2g(2)
f(a,{a,b,c}, ˆ X,U) = f(b,{a,b,c}, ˆ X,U) = f(c,{a,b,c}, ˆ X,U) = 5g(2)
That is, a beats b when the choice set is {a,b}, while the selves cancel each other out
for any other subset of ˆ X. We call such a collection of selves deﬁned on ˆ X a triple-
basis for this aggregator. In the case of this aggregator, the selves above would
still be a triple-basis if we were to scale all the utilities by a common constant.
Given an arbitrary X and any choice function c deﬁned on X, we can use the
triple-basis above to construct a collection of selves that rationalize c using the
passion-driven aggregator f. The procedure works as follows. We examine all
possible choice sets in X from smallest to largest, ﬁrst going through all choice
sets of size two, then all choice sets of size three, etc. We ignore any choice set
that does not cause an IIA violation. For each choice set A that does cause an IIA
violation, the construction creates a collection of selves UA deﬁned on X such that
1. c(A) is selected under f ◦UA from every subset of A in which it is contained
2. The selves UA cancel each other out under f on every other choice set (that
is, on sets not containing c(A) or sets containing some element of X \ A).
3. The selves UA are “indiﬀerent enough” so that their trickle-down eﬀect does
not overturn the strict preference of previously constructed selves
14In the i-th column, the alternative on the left is assigned the utility number to its right.
15Finally, the construction creates an extra self u∗, that is indiﬀerent enough
never to overturn any of the other selves’ strict preferences, in the standard way:
the self allocates the highest utility to c(X), the next highest utility to X\{c(X)},
and so on. All in all, this procedure constructs a collection of 1+5·IIA(c) selves.
Using the triple-basis above, it is easy to construct the collection of selves UA
associated with a set A that causes an IIA violation. To satisfy the ﬁrst two
properties above, we simply let c(A) play the role of a in the triple-basis, all the
elements of A\{c(A)} play the role of b, and all the elements of X\A play the role
of c. That is, we extend the utilities from {a,b,c} to the given X such that: each
self allocates the same utility to c(A) as to a in the triple-basis, the same utility
to elements of A/c(A) as to b in the triple base, and the same utility to X/A
as to c in the triple-basis. Neutrality (P1) and duplication (P5) then imply that
the properties of the triple-basis carry over: for each B ⊆ A that contains c(A),
f(c(A),B,X,UA) > f(y,B,X,UA) for all y ∈ B\{c(A)}, and for all other subsets
B0 ⊆ X, f(x,B0A) = f(y,B0A) for all x,y ∈ B0. To satisfy the third property
above, we can use continuity (P4) and scale all the selves in the triple-basis by
some appropriately chosen ε > 0.
This entire collection of selves rationalizes c(·) under f. The construction
ensures that c(A) is selected from any set causing an IIA violation; one need
only check that constructed selves do not interfere with choices associated with
sets that do not cause IIA violations. To loosely illustrate the idea, consider any
nested sequence of choice sets that decreases by one alternative. Given X, or any
set from which c does not contradict the choice from X, all selves besides u∗ are
indiﬀerent, hence by single-self respect (P2) and separability (P3) the preferences
of u∗ prevail. For the ﬁrst set of the sequence that contradicts the choice from
X, a 5-tuple of selves was created who are passionate enough to overrule u∗ and
guarantee that the c-choice from this set is the f-maximizer (while all other 5-
tuples will be indiﬀerent). Similarly, whenever along the sequence there is a set
that contradicts the choice of the previous set, another 5-tuple of selves was created
that overrules the preferences of all selves created in association with larger sets.
The above construction implies that if we permit the model to have n selves,
any choice function (on any grand set of alternatives) having fewer than n−1
5 IIA-
violations can be rationalized using this aggregator.
164.2 Main rationalizability result
The construction from the previous subsection can be generalized to any aggregator
having the property that there exists k ∈ Z+ such that there exists a triple-
basis consisting of k selves that are arbitrarily close to being indiﬀerent. As we
showed above, passion-driven aggregators satisfy this requirement with k = 5.
This property is relatively simple to check for a concrete aggregator, since it is
deﬁned for a three-element set. For scale-invariant aggregators, which satisfy the
property that measuring utilities in a diﬀerent unit does not change the ordering
implied by the aggregator, checking the property is particularly simple, since it
then suﬃces to construct one triple-basis which can be scaled as needed. For
investigating how large is the set of aggregators satisfying the property, and for
suﬃcient conditions for the property, see the next subsection.
Deﬁnition 4.1. We say ˆ U ∈ U({a,b,c}) is a triple-basis for f with respect to
{a,b,c} if f(a,{a,b},{a,b,c}, ˆ U) > f(b,{a,b},{a,b,c}, ˆ U), and f(·,A,{a,b,c}, ˆ U)
is constant for all other A ⊆ {a,b,c}.
Condition (Triple-solvability of f with k selves) There exists a triple {a,b,c} and
k ∈ Z+ such that for every δ > 0, there is a U ∈ Uk({a,b,c}) that is a δ-indiﬀerent
triple-basis for f with respect to {a,b,c}.
Triple-solvability with k selves implies that we can ﬁnd a sequence of triple-
bases containing k selves that converge to indiﬀerence.
Our main theorem applies to all aggregators satisfying P1-P6 and triple-solvability
Theorem 4.2. Suppose f satisﬁes P1-P6 and is triple-solvable with kf selves.
Then, using n selves, f can rationalize any choice function c, deﬁned on any ﬁnite
grand set of alternatives X, that exhibits at most n−1
kf IIA-violations.
The choice functions exhibiting no more than n−1
kf IIA-violations constitute a
lower bound on behaviors that an aggregator f satisfying the conditions in the
theorem can rationalize. The result can be restated such that if f satisﬁes P1-P6
and is triple-solvable with kf selves then it can rationalize any choice function c
with no more than 1 + kf · IIA(c) selves. That is, 1 + kf · IIA(c) is an upper
bound on the number of selves (or complexity) required for rationalizing c with f.
It is therefore evident that, in spite of having a structured form, any aggregator
satisfying these properties can rationalize any choice function if suﬃciently many
selves are permitted by the model.
174.3 Suﬃcient conditions for the main result
A natural question is how large is the set of aggregators that satisfy the triple-
solvability condition in Theorem 4.2. As for the aggregators featured in Section 2.3,
which are closely related to models proposed in the existing literature, it is straight-
forward to show that all of them satisfy the condition. For example, permuting
the alternatives a and b in the selves in the triple-basis for the passion-driven ag-
gregator featured in the previous section works for passion-muting aggregators.15
Below we formally investigate how large the set of aggregators satisfying the
triple-solvability condition is within the class of anonymous, additive and scale-
invariant aggregators, and ﬁnd uniform bounds for kf. Formally, we impose the
following additional structure.





it holds that f(·,·,X,U) = f(·,·,X,π(U)).
P8 (Scale invariance) There is an invertible and odd φ : R → R such that
f(·,·,X,αU) = φ(α)f(·,·,X,U) ∀ α ∈ R.





∀ X ∈ X, A ⊂ X and U ∈ Un(X).
Anonymity implies that the aggregation is symmetric with respect to selves.
Scale-invariance implies that the ordering of diﬀerent elements in the aggregation
does not depend on the scale in which utilities are measured. Additive separability
is a strengthening of P3, and is a common functional form assumption.16




f(a,A,X,ui), where f(a,A,X,αu) = φ(α)f(a,A,X,u).17
To measure the diﬀerence in aggregate utilities over any two alternatives within
15Contact the authors for triple-basis for aggregators featured in the other examples.
16To break this condition down, consider the following properties:
P9’ (Strong Continuity) The ordering of elements over A implied by f(·,A,X,U) is continuous
in U for every A ⊂ X.
P9” (Independence) For any A ⊂ X and a ∈ A, and any U,U0,V 0,V 00 ∈ U, f(a,A,X,(U,V 0)) =
f(a,A,X,(U0,V 0)) implies f(a,A,X,(U,V 00)) = f(a,A,X,(U0,V 00)).
Note that P9’ implies P3, which requires the ordering of elements implied by f to be continuous
in U only at indiﬀerent selves. Then P1, P2 and P4, together with P9’ and P9” imply P9, by
Debreu’s aggregation theorem. We do not provide the details here, referring the interested reader
to Debreu (1959, Theorem 3) and also Maskin (1978).
17It actually suﬃces for our results that f is equivalent to such an aggregator (see the discussion
on ordinal properties of our model in Subsection 2.1).
18any choice set, we introduce the shorthand
fac(u) = f(a,{a,c},{a,b,c},u) − f(c,{a,c},{a,b,c},u),
fa(u) = f(a,{a,b,c},{a,b,c},u)
for arbitrary {a,b,c} and any single self u ∈ R{a,b,c}; as well as the shorthand
fac(U) =
Pn
i=1 fac(ui) and fa(U) =
Pn
i=1 fa(ui) for a collection of selves U.
Suppose that there exists a positive constant γ and possibly menu-dependent
constants δA such that the aggregator f takes the form f(a,A,{a,b,c},u) =
γui(a) + δA for every a and every A ⊆ {a,b,c}. In this case, it is easy to see
that although aggregate utility is aﬀected cardinally by menu-dependence, it is
not aﬀected ordinally, and the resulting choice behavior is always rational. In par-
ticular, for any collection of selves U, knowing how the aggregator acts on any two
pairs (for example, fab(U) and fbc(U)) one may immediately recover fab(U) as the
sum of these. To rule out such degenerate menu dependence, we introduce the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4.3. If U ∈ U({a,b,c}), we say that f ◦U is type-1 nondegenerate (on
{a,b,c}) if fac(U) 6= fab(U) + fbc(U).
As seen from the discussion above, nondegeneracy requires that f “stretch”
utility diﬀerences in a manner that depends on the choice set. That is, preference
intensity must be aﬀected by the alternatives at hand.
Observe that for any {a,b,c} and any U ∈ U({a,b,c}), f◦U generates a ranking
of the alternatives in the triple: a is better than b in the triple if fa(U) ≥ fb(U).
If f ◦ U rationalizes a choice function, there is a unique best element in the triple
which is selected by the choice function. The worst elements in the triple are those
x ∈ {a,b,c} such that fx(U) ≤ fy(U) for all y ∈ {a,b,c}. Observe that f ◦ U also
generates a ranking over alternatives from pairwise choice: a is better than b if
fab(U) ≥ 0. If the ranking generated from pairs is transitive, and f ◦ U generates
a choice function, then there exists a unique worst pairwise element.
The next theorem establishes that if there exist selves U, deﬁned on the triple
{a,b,c}, for which f ◦ U is type-1 nondegerate and rationalizes some irrational
behavior where the worst element according to pairwise choice “moves up” in the
triple, then the aggregator is triple-solvable.
19Theorem 4.4. Let f satisfy P1-P9. Consider any {a,b,c} ∈ X, and suppose there
exists U ∈ U({a,b,c}) such that f ◦ U is type-1 nondegenerate and rationalizes
an irrational behavior in which the worst element over the pairs is not among the
worst elements in the triple. Then there is kf such that f is triple-solvable with
kf selves.
In particular, this implies that if f ◦ U is type-1 nondegenerate and satisﬁes
one of the following two simple “extreme-switching” properties, then it is triple-
solvable: (i) the worst element over the pairs is the best in the triple; or (ii) the
best element over the pairs is the worst element in the triple. The ﬁrst behavior
corresponds to what GH call “third-place choice.” The second occurs in one type
of “second-place choice.” If the aggregator can rationalize such preference shifts
on a triple, it can rationalize any choice behavior on any grand set of alternatives;
and with a ﬁxed number of selves, the bounds of Theorem 4.2 apply.
The above result does not provide a bound on the number of selves in the
triple-basis. The next theorem gives a uniform bound, under a diﬀerent but related
assumption on the aggregator using one self deﬁned on the triple.
Deﬁnition 4.5. If u ∈ R{a,b,c}, we say that f ◦ u is type-2 nondegenerate (on
{a,b,c}) if [fa(u) − fb(u)] + [fa(u) − fc(u)] 6= fab(u) + fac(u).
This non-degeneracy condition rules out that the same linear relationship holds,
for any possible self, between aggregated utilities given three-alternative and two-
alternative sets.18 These nondegeneracy conditions combined provide a uniform
bound for the number of selves in a triple-basis.
Theorem 4.6. Suppose f satisﬁes P1-P9. Consider any {a,b,c} ∈ X. If there
exists a single self u on {a,b,c} such that f ◦u is type-1 and type-2 nondegenerate
then f is triple-solvable with no more than 5 selves.
18It is easy to show, for example, that the passion-driven aggregator of Example 2.2 violates
this condition of linear context-dependence whenever g(·) is nonlinear. Contact the authors for
a proof.
205 Applications
5.1 Choice over menus: a generalized Strotzian model
In this section we apply our model and the results of Section 4 to examine the
situation in which the DM is allowed to choose the menu from which she will pick
an alternative. We will refer to the selection of a menu as the ﬁrst stage of the
decision problem, and posit the following testable restrictions on ﬁrst-stage choice
behavior. Denoting the grand set of alternatives by X, we assume that the DM
has a preference relation  on P(X) × P(X) satisfying three simple axioms.
Axiom 1 (Preference Relation)  is complete and transitive
The preference  is a strict ordering on {a}a∈X if for all a,b ∈ X, {a} 6∼ {b}.
Axiom 2 (Strict Ordering)  is a strict ordering on {a}a∈X
In the classical theory of choice, a set is assumed to be indiﬀerent to its best
element. Since then, various authors have relaxed this assumption by assuming,
for example, that there are psychological costs to be borne by the introduction of
unchosen but tempting elements, as in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001). Instead of such
psychological costs, our model emphasizes inner conﬂict in choosing amongst alter-
natives. The set of alternatives may aﬀect the chosen alternative in a manner that
violates IIA. However, we retain the idea that the set is indiﬀerent to the “best”
element inside it, even if that element may not arise from a menu-independent
ranking. That is, we posit the Independence of Utility to Unchosen Alternatives
(IUUA): taking as given whatever element is chosen, the unchosen alternatives do
not aﬀect the well-being of the DM.
Axiom 3 (IUUA) For all A ∈ P(X), there exists a ∈ A such that A ∼ {a}
Axiom 3 says that given a set of available menus and hence ﬁxed ﬁrst stage
preferences of the DM, any decision maker maximizing these preferences is indiﬀer-
ent between the choice set A and getting just a, which we interpret as the element
that is foreseen to be chosen from A.
This implies that for each prize a ∈ X, there is an equivalence class (let us
call these classes “bins”) and that each menu A ∈ P(X) falls into one of these
bins. Axioms 1-3 together ensure that we may uniquely deﬁne an induced choice
function c : P(X) → X by c(A) = a if a ∈ A and A ∼ {a}. We may then obtain
the following representation theorem for choice over menus, which also provides a
21bound on the second-stage subjective state space.
Theorem 5.1.  satisﬁes Axioms 1-3 if and only if there exist selves U =
(u1,u2,...,un) ∈ U(X) and a utility function W : X → R on prizes such that
 is represented by the utility function V : P(X) → R on sets, deﬁned by







where f satisﬁes P1-P6 and triple-solvability with k selves, and n ≤ 1+k·IIA(c).
Proof. Because each menu is indiﬀerent to the alternative chosen by the induced
choice function, the DM’s preferences over menus may be represented by a utility
function W(·) over the alternatives in X. We may then use the result of Theorem
4.2 to rationalize the induced choice function.
The representation may be interpreted as follows. When evaluating a choice
set, the DM considers the various, possibly conﬂicting interests that will govern
her choice from the set. These interests are represented by the selves U. The
motivations that govern her choices from diﬀerent menus need not be the same
as W, which governs her choice over menus (although those motivations might be
related to W). The DM simply picks the set from which the element foreseen to
be chosen yields the greatest ﬁrst stage utility. Consequently, the representation
may be thought of as a generalized Strotzian preference (Strotz (1955)), where the
DM chooses the best menu subject not to the choice of one self, but rather the
choice maximizing the aggregate utility of multiple selves.19
The model implies that for any pair {a,b}, either {a,b} ∼ {a} or {a,b} ∼ {b}.
However, for larger sets, it may be that A∪B  A,B (interpreted as a preference
for ﬂexibility in Kreps (1979)), that A,B  A ∪ B, or that A  A ∪ B  B
(as in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001)’s betweenness, which they interpret in terms
of costly self-control). The interpretation here is diﬀerent: the DM is conﬂicted
when she makes her choice from the menu, and depending on how she resolves
the compromise among selves, might prefer a larger or smaller set that leads to a
better choice according to the ex-ante utility W. How A ∪ B stands in relation to
A and B provides information as to when the DM expects to be conﬂicted.
19We thank Eddie Dekel for suggesting this interpretation. We note that the above conception
can reverse the logic in the branch of temptation and self-control literature begun by Gul and
Pesendorfer (2001), but bears a relation to the separation of decision utility and experienced
utility proposed by Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997).
22Observation 5.1. If A∪B is not indiﬀerent to either A or B then an IIA violation
necessarily occurs in the induced choice function; and when an IIA violation occurs,
the upper bound on the minimal number of states (in our interpretation, selves)
required to rationalize the behavior increases.
Using one of the approximately triple-solvable aggregators introduced in Section
6.1, each IIA violation in the induced choice function corresponds to one additional
state. This is related to Dekel et al. (2001)’s result, where the subjective state
space in a model of unforseen contingencies grows when there is additional desire
for ﬂexibility or self-control.20 Here, “anticipated” IIA violations reveal additional
conﬂicting motivations.
5.2 Microeconomic models of collective household choice
Empirical evidence on household demand strongly suggests that it cannot arise
from the maximization of a single utility. An extensive literature examines the
microeconomic implications of collective choice in households where each member
is a utility maximizer; and in particular, a branch of this literature examines such
models under the restriction of Pareto-eﬃcient household behavior. One question
addressed in this setting is, given a household demand function over N goods, when
do there exist n utility functions {ui}n
i=1 and a continuously diﬀerentiable function
µ of prices and income such that the demand arises from the weighted utilitarian
maximization of
Pn
i=1 µ(price,income)ui(·) given the budget set (i.e., weights and
preferences vary independently). Browning and Chiappori (1998) show that if
there are N goods, then any demand data can be explained by an (N −1)-person
household. In addition, to explain a given demand function using n people, it
is necessary and suﬃcient that the rank of a certain matrix in a pseudo-Slutsky
matrix decomposition be n−1, though without further restrictions there can be a
continuum of explanatory n-person models (Chiappori and Ekeland (2006)).21
20It is also related to a trend seen in Gul and Pesendorfer (2005a) and Gul and Pesendorfer
(2005b): the case of no self-control in Gul and Pesendorfer (2005a) (A∪B ∼ A or A∪B ∼ B for
all A,B) can be rationalized with a single utility determining choice from the set, whereas the
less restrictive Betweenness-based model of self-control in Gul and Pesendorfer (2005b), which
only rules out violations in transitivity in an induced choice correspondence, can be rationalized
with two utilities.
21The pseudo-Slutsky matrix is formally deﬁned in Chiappori and Ekeland (2006); the rank
condition they give, SR(n−1), is that this matrix can be decomposed as the sum of a symmetric
negative semi-deﬁnite matrix and another matrix of rank at most n − 1. One intuition for the
23To apply our framework in this context, we reinterpret selves as individuals of
the household, and the aggregator as the mechanism that translates the individ-
uals’ preferences to household choice (this might be the outcome of a particular
household bargaining procedure). Our approach diﬀers in a number of ways from
Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Chiappori and Ekeland (2006). First, the
aggregator need not be weighted utilitarianism. Second, we address the question
of rationalization by a concrete aggregator, while the above papers assume that
the modeler does not know the underlying aggregation rule of the household, only
that it belongs to the class of weighted utilitarian aggregators. Finally, we examine
choice functions instead of demand functions. However, given that demand data
is typically ﬁnite, suppose we denote by X the (ﬁnite) set of all available alloca-
tions, let each budget set correspond to a subset A ⊂ X, and identify the demand
data with a function c that selects the allocation c(A) in the budget set A. Then,
rationalizing the demand data corresponds to rationalizing an incomplete choice
function: c renders a choice to any subset A of X for some collection of subsets
A ⊂ 2X, but data on choices from sets in 2X/A is missing. As we show below, our
results can easily be extended to arbitrary incomplete choice functions.
Rationalizing an incomplete choice function c with aggregator f implies ﬁnding
a set of selves U on X such that f(c(A),A,X,U) > f(a,A,X,U) for all a ∈
A/{c(A)} and A ∈ A (it does not matter what choices f and U imply from sets
in 2X/A). To see how our theorems generalize, observe that the only element of
the construction that needs to be modiﬁed is the number of IIA violations: in this
more general context we say that an IIA-violation is associated with choice set
A ∈ A if there is a nested sequence of choice sets A1,A2,...,Ak such that A1 = X,
|Aj| − |Aj+1| = 1 ∀ j ∈ {1,...,k − 1}, and Ak = A for which the choice from Ak
contradicts the choice from Al for some l < k, and Al0 / ∈ A for any l < l0 < k. It
is easy to see that this deﬁnition reduces to the original one in case of no missing
data. Once the deﬁnition of IIA(c) is modiﬁed accordingly, it can be shown that
Theorem 4.2 holds (the proof is analogous).22
This means that for any aggregator satisfying our conditions, the demand data
can be rationalized if there are suﬃciently many people in the household. This
proof, which relies on exterior diﬀerential calculus, is that the Pareto-frontier for n people is n−1
dimensional, and weights and preferences can be varied independently.
22We note that IIA(c) for an incomplete choice function might be strictly less than IIA(c) for
any completion b c of c. That is, it can be that any way of specifying choices for sets in 2X/A
creates new IIA violations. Nevertheless, our theorems apply.
24complements the result obtained in Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Chiappori
and Ekeland (2006), in that even if the researcher knows how preferences in the
household are aggregated, if the number of individuals in the (extended) household
is large or unknown, then the model does not imply any testable restrictions on
household demand. Our combinatorial approach also permits a simple lower bound
on demand data that a household with a known number of individuals can generate,
in terms of the number of IIA violations implied by the demand data.
6 Tightening the bounds on rationalizability
The bound on the set of rationalizable choice functions provided in our main results
is not tight in general. Below we describe two methods of strengthening the results
while keeping the basic features of our original construction, which in some cases
lead to a tight bound. First, for some aggregators it is possible to ﬁnd a tighter
bound through a weakening of the triple-solvability requirement. Secondly, it may
be possible to obtain a tighter bound by combining (or collapsing) some of the
selves constructed, especially when the DM tends to make mistakes “in the same
direction.”
6.1 Approximate triple-solvability
For some aggregators a tighter upper bound can be provided for the minimum
number of selves needed to rationalize a choice function, through a weakening of
the triple-solvability requirement. In particular, it suﬃces for triple-solvability to
hold only approximately, which can yield a triple-basis with a smaller number of
selves. For ease of exposition we only state this property for additively separable
aggregators.
Deﬁnition 6.1. We say ˆ U ∈ U({a,b,c}) is a (δ,ε)-approximate triple-basis for
f with respect to {a,b,c} if f(a,{a,b},{a,b,c}, ˆ U) = f(b,{a,b},{a,b,c}, ˆ U) + δ
and |f(x,A,{a,b,c}, ˆ U) − f(y,A,{a,b,c}, ˆ U)| < ε for all other A ⊆ {a,b,c} and
x,y ∈ A.
That is, a collection of selves U is a (δ,ε)-approximate triple basis for f if
given choice set {a,b} the aggregated utility of U for a is exactly δ higher than the
25aggregated utility of b, while U is ε-indiﬀerent among all alternatives given every
other choice set.
We say that an aggregator f is approximately triple-solvable with k selves if
there is δ > 0 such that exists a (δ,ε)-approximate triple-basis with k selves for
every δ < δ and ε > 0. That is, for approximate triple-solvability we do not require
that the collection of selves in the triple is exactly indiﬀerent between all elements
in choice sets other than {a,b}, only that they can be arbitrarily close to being
indiﬀerent.
Theorem 4.2 can then be modiﬁed as follows.
Theorem 6.2. Suppose f satisﬁes P1-P6 and P9, and is approximately triple-
solvable with kf selves. Then, for any ﬁnite set of alternatives X, and any choice
function c : P(X) → X that exhibits at most n−1
kf IIA-violations, f can rationalize
c with n selves.
The proof is given in the Appendix.
To see why this result is powerful, take any aggregator of the form f(a,A,X,U) =
Pn
i=1 h(maxa0∈A ui(a0))ui(a), where limx→∞ h(x)x = 0. For example, consider a








p, p > 1.
Under such an aggregator, the presence of an alternative with very high utility for
a self means that self is given less say in the decision process (a “populist”-type
model). This can be used to create a single-self approximate triple-basis u: let
u(a) and u(b) such that f(a,{a,b},{a,b,c},u) − f(b,{a,b},{a,b,c},u) = δ (for
small enough δ this is always possible), and let u(c) be high enough so that u is
ε-indiﬀerent between any two elements given sets containing c. Theorem 6.2 then
implies that the aggregator can rationalize all choice functions with no more than
n − 1 IIA-violations, with n selves.
6.2 Collapsing triple-bases
Our construction allocates a diﬀerent triple-basis (or approximate triple-basis)
for every IIA-violation. However, there can be IIA-violations not contradicting
26each other, in which case parts of the associated triple-bases can be combined (or
collapsed) together.
For example, recall the triple-basis we found for the passion-driven aggregator,
and ﬁx some alternative a. Observe that every time the choice of a from some
set causes an IIA violation, the triple-basis constructed has a self u5 in which a is
preferred to X \{a}, all elements of which are indiﬀerent to each other. Under the
passion-driven aggregator, all of the u5 selves constructed when the choice was a
can be collapsed into a single-self. That is, there would be a self for each distinct
alternative whose choice causes an IIA violation, and four selves per violation in
general. Consequently, “mistakes” in the same direction (e.g., always in the choice
of a) can require fewer selves.
This eﬀect is particularly pronounced when the triple-basis has only one self,
as in the approximately triple-solvable aggregators introduced above. To illustrate
this, consider the following example: let x∗ ∈ X, and let 1 and 2 be strict
orderings on X such that x 1 x∗ and x 2 x∗ for every x ∈ X/{x∗}, and y 1 x
for x,y ∈ X/{x∗} if and only if x 2 y. Consider a decision-maker who from choice
sets not containing x∗ selects the best element according to 1, but from choice sets
containing x∗ selects the best element according to 2. This behavior describes,
for example, a customer in a restaurant who chooses the tastiest item from a menu
if the menu does not contain onion rings, while choosing the healthiest item in the
presence of onion rings, because they are so greasy as to make the customer feel
guilty about his eating habits.23
The above simple behavior generates a large number of IIA-violations if X is
large.24 However, these IIA-violations do not contradict each other: if choice from
set B contradicts the choice from A ⊃ B, then there is no B0 ⊂ B such that the
choice from B0 contradicts the choice from B. As we show below, this can be used
to merge all collections of selves into a single collection, drastically reducing the
number of selves required to rationalize the above choice function.
Consider the context-dependent version of relative utilitarianism introduced in
the previous subsection, which was shown to be approximately triple-solvable with
a single self. Our construction calls for (i) creating a self whose utility function is
in line with 2; and (ii) creating a self for all sets associated with an IIA-violation,
23We thank Ran Spiegler for suggesting that we consider an example along these lines.
24The number of IIA-violations is 2n−1 − n − 1: the choice from every set B having at least
two elements and not containing x∗ contradicts the choice from B ∪ {x∗}.
27such that the self attaches high enough utility to x∗ such that the self becomes
close enough to indiﬀerent in the presence of x∗, and among the other alternatives
allocates the highest utility to the choice from the given set. However, the latter
selves can all be collapsed into a single self, such that the utility function of the self
is in line with 1 over X/{x∗} (while keeping the utility of x∗ at a level that makes
the self nearly indiﬀerent in the presence of x∗). This implies that the above choice
function can be rationalized with two selves, which is obviously a tight bound.
7 Conclusion
The framework we propose in this paper provides a ﬂexible environment for ax-
iomatic investigation of multi-self models. As we pointed out, many of the models
proposed in the existing literature can be translated into our framework such that
the resulting aggregators satisfy the basic axioms we posited. However, there are
other classes of aggregators that might be of interest, for example ordinal ones,
which do not satisfy all our axioms. Our framework can still be useful to exam-
ine these aggregators, only some of our axioms need to be replaced by axioms
that reﬂect the deﬁning characteristics of the aggregators at hand. Furthermore,
our set of axioms can also be supplemented with additional ones, leading to more
speciﬁc classes of aggregators instead of the broad class of aggregation rules that
we investigated in this paper, and hence to sharper predictions on implied choice
with a ﬁxed number of selves. We leave this direction, as well as extending our
framework to dynamic settings, to future research.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 4.2. For an arbitrary choice function c we will construct a col-
lection of 1 + k · IIA(c) selves which will be shown to rationalize c. This implies
the claim in the theorem. In particular, we will construct k selves for each set with
which an IIA-violation is associated, and an extra self for X.
Let I1 = {A1
1,...,A1
i1} be the subsets of X such that there is an IIA-violation
associated with the set, but there is no proper subset of the set with which an
IIA-violation is associated. For j ≥ 2, let Ij = {A1
1,...,A1
ij+1} be the subsets of X
such that there is an IIA-violation associated with the set, but there is no proper
subset of the set outside
j−1 S
l=1
Il with which an IIA-violation is associated. Let j∗ be
the largest j such that Ij 6= ∅.
We will now iteratively construct a k-tuple of selves for each set associated
with an IIA-violation, starting with sets in I1. Consider any k-tuple of selves
¯ U1 = (¯ u1
1,... ¯ u1
k) that solves the triple {a,b,c} (the existence of such a triple
follows from triple-solvability). For every A ⊂ I1, construct now the following










i(a) if x = c(A)
¯ u1
i(b) if x ∈ A, x 6= c(A)
¯ u1
i(c) if x 6∈ A
for every i = 1,...,k.
Suppose now that UA is deﬁned for every A ∈
j S
k=1
Ik for some j ≥ 1. Let
Uk be the collection of selves Uk = (UAk
1,...,U
Ak
ik), for k = 1,...,j. Let b Uj =
(U1,...,Uj). By P4, there exists δ > 0 such that for any k-tuple of δ-indiﬀerent col-
lection of selves U0, f(a,A,X, b Uj) > f(b,A,X, b Uj) implies f(a,A,X,(b Uj,U0)) >
f(b,A,X,(b Uj,U0)). Then by P3 and P6, we know f(a,A,X, b Uj, e U1,..., e Um) >
f(b,A,X, b Uj, e U1,..., e Um) implies the relation f(a,A,X,(b Uj, e U1,..., e Um,U0)) >
f(b,A,X,(b Uj, e U1,..., e Um,U0)) for any e U1,..., e Um collections of (exactly) indiﬀerent
selves.
29Let now Ij+1 = {A1
1,...,A1
ij+1} be the subsets of X such that there is an IIA-
violation associated with the set, but there is no proper subset of the set outside
Ij with which an IIA-violation is associated. By triple-solvability with k selves,
there is a δ-indiﬀerent k-tuple of selves ¯ Uj+1 = (¯ u
j+1
1 ,... ¯ u
j+1
k ) that solves the












i (a) if x = c(A)
¯ u
j+1
i (b) if x ∈ A, x 6= c(A)
¯ u
j+1
i (c) if x 6∈ A




The above procedure generates a collection of k·IIA(c) selves in j∗ steps. Then
by P3 and P4 there is δj∗ > 0 such that for any δj∗-indiﬀerent u, f(a,A,X,Uj∗) >
f(b,A,X,Uj∗) implies f(a,A,X,(Uj∗,u)) > f(b,A,X,(Uj∗,u)). Finally, construct
one more self the following way: let a1 = c(X) and ak = c(X \ {a1,a2,...ak−1})
for 2 ≤ k ≤ n. Construct u∗ : X → R such that u∗(a1) > u∗(a2) > ··· > u∗(an)
and u∗ is δj∗-indiﬀerent.
We show the collection of selves Uc ≡ (Uj∗,u∗) rationalize c with aggregator f.
Observation. First, note that for any set A with which there is an IIA viola-
tion associated, by the construction of UA and by P1 and P5, f(a,B,X,UA) =
f(b,B,X,UA) ∀ a,b ∈ B and B such that either B/A 6= ∅ or c(A) / ∈ B, and
f(c(A),B,X,UA) > f(b,B,X,UA) = f(b0,B,X,UA) ∀ b,b0 ∈ B/{c(A)} and B
such that B/A = ∅ and c(A) ∈ B.
We will now show that the choice induced by f from any choice set is equal to
the choice implied by c. First, note that this holds for X, since by the observation,
f(a,X,X,UA) = f(b,X,X,UA) for every a,b ∈ X and every A with which there
is an IIA-violation associated. Moreover, f(c(X),X,X,u∗) > f(a,X,X,u∗) ∀
a ∈ X/{c(X)} by P2. Then repeated application of P3 implies f(c(X),X,X,Uc) >
f(a,X,X,Uc) ∀ a ∈ X/{c(X)}.
Next, consider any A ( X which causes an IIA violation. Suppose A ∈ Ij. The
observation implies that for any B ∈ (
j S
l=1
Il)/A, f(a,A,UB) = f(a0,A,UB) ∀ a,a0 ∈
A, and f(c(A),A,X,UA) > f(a,A,X,UA) ∀ a ∈ A. Then repeated implication
of P3 implies f(c(A),A,X,Uj) > f(a,A,X,Uj) ∀ a ∈ A. By construction then
30f(c(A),A,X,Uc) > f(a,A,X,Uc) ∀ a ∈ A.
There are three cases to check for a set A that does not cause an IIA violation.
Case 1: For all a ∈ A, there is no B ⊃ A such that a = c(B). Then by construction
u∗(c(B)) > u∗(b) ∀ b ∈ B/{c(B)}. Moreover, by the observation, f(b,B,X,UA) =
f(b,B,X,UA) ∀ b,b0 ∈ B and A with which an IIA violation is associated. Re-
peated use of P3, together with P2, implies f(c(B),B,X,Uc) > f(b,B,X,Uc) ∀
b ∈ B.
Case 2: There is a unique a ∈ A such that for some B ⊃ A, c(B) = a. First we
note that a = c(A) is necessary, otherwise A would have caused an IIA violation.
There are two subcases:
Case 2a: For every B such that B ⊃ A and c(B) = a, B did not cause an IIA
violation. This means that for all B ⊃ A, c(B) 6∈ A\{c(A)}. So just like in Case 1,
u∗(c(B)) > u∗(b) ∀ b ∈ B/{c(B)}, and f(b,B,X,UA) = f(b,B,X,UA) ∀ b,b0 ∈ B
and A with which an IIA violation is associated. Hence, f(c(B),B,X,Uc) >
f(b,B,X,Uc) ∀ b ∈ B.
Case 2b: There is B ⊃ A with c(B) = a such that B caused an IIA violation.




Il either f(c(B),B,X,UA) > f(b,B,X,UA) ∀ b ∈ B, or f(b,B,X,UA) =
f(b0,B,X,UA) ∀ b,b0 ∈ B. But then repeated application of P3 implies that
f(c(B),B,X,Uj) > f(b,B,X,Uj) ∀ b ∈ B. By construction, f(c(B),B,X,Uc) >
f(b,B,X,Uc) ∀ b ∈ B.
Case 3: There exist at least two elements in A that have each been chosen in some
superset. First, note that one of those elements must be a = c(A), otherwise A
would have caused an IIA violation. Let {bi}i be the set of elements other than
a such that bi ∈ A and bi = c(Bi) for some Bi ⊃ A. Drop any bi’s such that
Bi ⊂ Bm for some m and call the remaining set {bj}. Because A did not cause
an IIA violation by assumption, it must be that for each bj there is A0
j such that
A ⊂ A0
j ⊂ Bj and c(A0
j) ∈ A. Because Bj does not contain any Bk, we know
c(A0
j) = a. For each j there may be multiple such A0
j’s; consider only the maximal
A0
j with respect to the minimal Bj. Now by maximality, for any A00 such that
A0
j ⊂ A00 ⊂ Bj, c(A00) 6∈ A. If there is A00 such that c(A00) ∈ A0
j, since c(A00) 6= a, by
deﬁnition A0
j caused an IIA violation with respect to the ﬁrst such A00. If for every
A00 it is the case that c(A00) 6∈ A0
j, then once again A0
j caused an IIA violation with
respect to B. Either way, since c(A0
j) = a, we added selves to ensure this choice
31for every j. This means that a should be the choice from A unless for some set
B0 between the smallest-sized A0
j and A we have c(B0) ∈ A \ {a} and selves were
added. But by minimality of the Bj’s there cannot be such a set.
For compactness, we use the notation x1 = fa(U)−fb(U), x2 = fb(U)−fc(U),
x3 = fac(U), x4 = fbc(U), and x5 = fab(U). We prove the suﬃciency conditions in
the reverse order stated.
Proof of Theorem 4.6. We show a stronger result than stated: under type-1 non-
degeneracy, if any one of the equations 2x1+x2−x3−x5 = 0, x1+2x2−x3−x4 = 0,
or x1 −x2 +x4 −x5 = 0 fail then the aggregator is triple-solvable (with kf at most
2 + 3|U|).
The ﬁrst column in the table lists the aggregate values for selves U. But by
neutrality, we know that if we can generate the values in column 1, we can also
generate the values in the 2nd column using the permutation (bc)(a) over the
alternatives, generate the values in the 3rd column using the permutation (ab)(c)
over the alternatives, and so on. By using duplication to evaluate each of the
values f ◦ u and f ◦ u0 each generated by a single self u and u0, with the rankings
given in the 6th and 7th headers, respectively, we can also generate the values in
those respective columns.
1 : U 2 : (bc)(a) 3 : (ab)(c) 4 : (abc) 5 : (acb) 6 : a ∼ b  c 7 : a  b ∼ c
x1 x1 + x2 −x1 x2 −x1 − x2 0 x1
x2 −x2 x1 + x2 −x1 − x2 x1 x1 0
x3 x5 x4 −x5 −x4 x1 x1
x4 −x4 x3 −x3 x5 x1 0
x5 x3 −x5 x4 −x3 0 x1
Then, determinants of three possible 5 × 5 matrices, each composed of ﬁve of the
columns above, may be calculated to obtain:
Det(1|3|5|6|7) = x2
1(x1 + 2x2 − x3 − x4)(2x1 + x2 − x3 − x5)(x3 − x4 − x5), (1)
Det(1|2|5|6|7) = x2
1(2x1 + x2 − x3 − x5)(x3 − x4 − x5)(x1 − x2 + x4 − x5), (2)
Det(2|3|4|6|7) = −x2
1(x1 + 2x2 − x3 − x4)(x3 − x4 − x5)(x1 − x2 + x4 − x5).(3)
To complete the proof, it suﬃces to show that there exists U such that deﬁn-
ing x1,x2,...,x5 as above, one of the determinants in Equations (1)-(3) must
32be nonzero. If one of those determinants is nonzero, then we have ﬁnd a vector
(c1,c2,c3,c4,c5) such that the nonsingular matrix times (c1,c2,c3,c4,c5) is equal to
(0,0,0,0,1). Using scaling, each ci can be pulled in so that the U corresponding to
the i-th column is multiplied by ci. The resulting set of selves provides a triple-basis
(and therefore we can get triple solvability through scaling that triple-basis).
The proof is completed in light of the linear dependence of the equations 2x1+
x2 − x3 − x5 = 0, x1 + 2x2 − x3 − x4 = 0, and x1 − x2 + x4 − x5 = 0: if any one of
these fails, there must be a second which fails too.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. By neutrality and symmetry of the type-1 nondegeneracy
condition x3 − x4 − x5 6= 0, there are three types of choice behaviors we must
examine to prove the result: one type of second-place choice (i), and both types
of third place choice (ii-iii). The result then follows from the previous proof.
Cases 1: a P b P c on the pairs, and b T c T a on the triple. If there is U
such that f ◦ U rationalizes this behavior, then x3,x4,x5 > 0 and x1 ≤ 0, x2 > 0.
Observe that 2x1 +x2 < 0 since this is fa(U)−fb(U)+fa(U)−fc(U). Therefore,
2x1 + x2 6= x3 + x5, as the RHS is positive.
Case 2: a P b P c on the pairs, and c T b T a on the triple. That is,
x3,x4,x5 > 0, with x1 ≤ 0 and x2 < 0. But as above, 2x1 +x2 6= x3 +x5, since the
LHS is negative and the RHS is positive.
Case 3: a P b P c on the pairs, and c T a T b on the triple. That is,
x3,x4,x5 > 0, with x1 ≥ 0, x2 < 0. If we can ﬁnd U such that f ◦ U rationalizes
this behavior, then observe that x1 + 2x2 is negative since this is fa(U) − fc(U) +
fb(U) − fc(U). Hence x1 + 2x2 6= x3 + x4 because the RHS is positive.
Proof of Theorem 6.2. The only diﬀerence compared to the proof of Theorem 4.2
is in the construction of selves. Recall the deﬁnition of (Ij)j=1,...,j∗ from the proof
of Theorem 4.2. Let δ1 ∈ (0,δ). Deﬁne iteratively δj for j ∈ {2,...,j∗ + 1}
such that δj ∈ (0,
δj−1
IIA(c)+1). Deﬁne a self uX such that uX is δj∗+1-indiﬀerent
and the preference ordering of the self is c(X)  c(X/{c(X)})  ... Let δ∗∗ =
min
x6=y∈X, A3x,y
|f(x,A,X,uX)| − |f(y,A,X,uX)|. Finally, let ε ∈ (0, δ∗∗
|X|). Then for
every j ∈ {1,...,j∗) and A ∈ Ij construct a self uA the following way: take a (δj,ε)-
approximate triple-basis u, and let uA(c(A)) = u(a), uA(x) = u(b) ∀ x ∈ A/{c(A)},
and uA(x) = u(c) ∀ x ∈ X/A. Proving the collection of selves consisting of uX and
uA for each A ∈
j∗ S
j=1
Ij rationalizes c is analogous to the proof in Theorem 4.2.
33Appendix B: Relaxing P6
Our main results can be extended to aggregators violating P6, that is, to aggrega-
tors that depend in a nontrivial way on alternatives unavailable in a given choice
set. However, the appropriate deﬁnition of triple-solvability is more complicated.
The main complication arising in the absence of P6 is that triple-solvability
needs to be deﬁned on a general X, as opposed to just a triple {a,b,c}. It is
convenient to introduce the following notation: for any triple {a,b,c}, any basic
set of alternatives X ⊃ {a,b,c}, and any self u deﬁned on {a,b,c}, deﬁne the set
E(u,X) = {b u : X → {u(a),u(b),u(c)}|b u(x) = u(x) ∀ x ∈ {a,b,c}}. In words,
E(u,X) is the set of extensions of u from {a,b,c} to X for which each element
in X/{a,b,c} receives the same utility as either a or b or c. Similarly, for any
U = (u1,...,um) ∈ U({a,b,c}), let E(U,X) = {(b u1,...,b um)|b ui ∈ E(ui,X) for all
i ∈ {1,...,m}}.
Deﬁnition B.1. We say U ∈ U({a,b,c}) is a universal triple-basis for f if for
any X ⊃ {a,b,c} the following holds: for all ˆ U ∈ E(U,X), f(a,{a,b},X, ˆ U) >
f(b,{a,b},X, ˆ U), and f(·,A,X, ˆ U) is constant for all other A ⊆ {a,b,c}.
A universal triple-basis solves the triple {a,b,c} whenever the utilities of unattain-
able elements don’t diﬀer from utilities of elements in {a,b,c}, for all selves in the
triple-basis. An aggregator f is universally triple-solvable if the following condi-
tion is satisﬁed.
Condition (Universal triple-solvability of f) There exists a triple {a,b,c} and k ∈
Z+ such that for every δ > 0 there is a δ-indiﬀerent U ∈ Uk({a,b,c}) constituting
a universal triple-basis for f with respect to {a,b,c}.
It is easy to see that for aggregators satisfying P6, universal triple-solvability is
equivalent to triple-solvability. If f satisfying P1-P5 is universally triple-solvable
with k selves, then the same construction can be applied as in the proof of Theorem
4.2 to obtain an analogous lower bound on the set of choice functions that f can
rationalize with a given number of selves. The proof of this result is analogous to
the proof of Theorem 4.2 and hence omitted.
Theorem B.2. Suppose f satisﬁes P1-P5 and is universally triple-solvable wrt
to X with kf selves. Then, using n selves, f can rationalize any choice function,
on any grand set of alternatives X, that exhibits at most n−1
kf IIA-violations.
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